Tese sobre MacIntyre defendida na Universitat Internacional de Catalunya, Barcelona.

Sandra Hernández González defendeu a tese de doutorado "El papel del deseo en la filosofía moral de Alasdair MacIntyre", na Universitat Internacional de Catalunya, Barcelona, Espanha, no âmbito do Departament de Humanitats. 

A tese pode ser acessada no link: El papel del deseo en la filosofía moral de Alasdaire MacIntyre. (tdx.cat)

Abstract:

Esta investigación se centra en la concepción macintyreana acerca del deseo y de su papel en el desarrollo moral1. Para MacIntyre, el deseo es la causa exclusiva e inmediata a la acción, pero los agentes morales pueden confundir fácilmente el deseo con el bien, o carecer de una jerarquía de deseos acorde con el bien teleológico que ordene racionalmente los distintos tipos de deseos. Por el contrario, cuando el agente es capaz de identificar y reflexionar sobre sus deseos, evaluarlos y dirigirlos hacia sus verdaderos bienes, ejerce un tipo de libertad interior que humaniza su obrar y que no lo deja a merced de la influencia instrumentalizadora de la moral y la economía de la modernidad, que ejerce una fuerte presión arbitraria sobre lo que el agente debería desear para que la moral y la economía de consumo funcionen como lo hacen actualmente. Lo que importa sobre los deseos es que sean libremente de bienes genuinos y, más particularmente, de lo que es bueno y mejor desear en nuestras circunstancias particulares, pues es solo a través de lo particular que la prudencia guía acertadamente hacia la excelencia humana. Esta perspectiva de lo particular pone en primer plano la necesidad de las virtudes morales e intelectuales en el recto obrar, a diferencia de la moral universal de preceptos, que por su carácter solo universal y normativo desatiende los aspectos particulares del agente y de sus circunstancias, dejándolo sin recursos ni criterios para orientar adecuadamente sus deseos. Por tanto, los problemas cruciales de la moral son los de saber identificar los bienes y lo que tenemos buenas razones para desear en cada momento o situación particular. Esta labor de discernimiento y ordenamiento de bienes y deseos no es sin embargo algo carente de conflicto. Y la experiencia del conflicto de deseos es correlativamente una experiencia de conflicto de bienes y de emociones o sentimientos, por lo que identificar la unidad del bien es un camino para la solución del conflicto de deseos y lograr la armonía afectiva que se deriva del logro del bien. Por tanto, lo que le da a la vida de cualquier agente particular su unidad –o su falta de unidad– es la relación entre los diversos bienes que ese agente persigue a través del tiempo, por lo que la clave para entender esas relaciones es la narrativa de esa vida. De ahí que la concepción narrativa de la virtud es esencial en la formación de los deseos. La ética macintyreana se puede pues con razón denominar una ética de ordenamiento de los deseos, que ofrece la base para el desarrollo de una psicología moral que supere el error teórico y práctico de considerar el conflicto moral como un conflicto entre razón y deseos, o entre bienes y males, y lo oriente hacia una comprensión del conflicto como un desorden en la fuerza de diversos deseos y sus bienes correspondientes. En este tipo de psicología moral, el deseo tiene un carácter predominante e inclusivo en el desarrollo moral, y fundamenta la propuesta macintyreana de que la formación moral es sobre todo una formación de carácter sentimental o afectivo. En conclusión, una adecuada integración de los deseos y tendencias en la acción es decisiva y esencial para el desarrollo moral y el logro de la excelencia y felicidad humana, tres aspectos inseparables en le ética del autor de Ética en los Conflictos de la Modernidad. Sobre el Deseo, el Razonamiento Práctico y la Narrativa. 1 Nos basamos en los escritos relevantes para nuestro tema a partir del giro macintyreano hacia el aristotelismo, a partir de la primera edición de After Virtue (1981).

Novo livro italiano sobre MacIntyre e a lei (direito) natural

Natura, ragione e relazione. Una prospettiva sulla legge naturale a partire da Alasdair MacIntyre

di Damiano Simoncelli

Quello della legge morale naturale è uno dei grandi temi che hanno impegnato la riflessione filosofica di Alasdair MacIntyre (Glasgow, 1929) negli ultimi tre decenni. Si tratta di un discorso che il filosofo scozzese sviluppa in costante dialogo con Tommaso d'Aquino e dentro un più ampio affinamento della propria teoria della razionalità pratica: il risultato di un simile sforzo è un'idea di legge di natura dai connotati fortemente dinamici, che aggrega gli esseri umani nella ricerca del vero, in un'intrapresa critica che non fa sconti né lascia spazio a facili compromessi. Lo studio esposto in questo volume si propone di offrirne una ricostruzione sistematica, non trascurandone i legami vitali con altri aspetti della speculazione macintyreana e promuovendo un rinnovato confronto con le fonti tommasiane. Esso si compendia in un invito a ripensare la legge morale naturale come logica delle relazioni buone con altri, con se stessi e con l'Altro.  

• Editore: Orthotes
• Collana: Ethica
• Data di Pubblicazione: gennaio 2021
• EAN: 9788893142878
• ISBN: 8893142872
• Pagine: 218
• Formato: brossura
• Argomenti: Etica e filosofia morale

Livro sobre MacIntyre, Kierkegaard e B. Williams, de 2018.

 This book takes the debate about the (ir)rationality of the transition to ethical life in Kierkegaard’s thought in a significantly new direction. Connecting the field of Kierkegaard studies with the meta-ethical debate about practical reasons, and engaging with Alasdair MacIntyre’s and Bernard Williams’ thought, it explores the rationality of the choices for ethical life and Christian existence. Defending a so-called ‘internalist’ understanding of practical reasons, Compaijen argues that previous attempts to defend Kierkegaard against MacIntyre’s charge of irrationality have failed. He provides a thorough analysis of such fundamental topics as becoming oneself, the ideal of objectivity in ethics and religion, the importance of the imagination, the power and limits of philosophical argument, and the relation between grace and nature. This book will be of great interest to Kierkegaard scholars in philosophy and theology, and, more generally, to anyone fascinated by the rationality of the transition to ethical life and the choice to accept Christianity.

 

 

Livro sobre a tradição do direito natural tem capítulo sobre Alasdair MacIntyre, editado por Francisco José Contreras

Sumário do livro 

About the Authors.- Foreword; Francisco José Contreras.- 1. Aristotle on Practical Rules, Universality, and Law; Jesús Vega.- 2. Cosmopolitanism and Natural Law in Cicero; Fernando Llano.- 3. Natural Law: Autonomous or Heteronomous? The Thomistic Perspective; Diego Poole.- 4. The Competing Sources of Aquinas' Natural Law: Aristotle, Roman Law and the Early Christian Fathers; Anna Taitslin.- 5. God and Natural Law: Reflections on Genesis 22; Matthew Levering.- 6. Natural Right and Coercion; Ana Marta González.- 7. Natural Law and the Phenomenological Given; Marta Albert.- 8. Perspectivism and Natural Law; Ignacio Sánchez Cámara.- 9. International Law and the Natural Law Tradition: The Influence of Verdross and Kelsen on Legaz Lacambra; María Elósegui.- 10. Natural Law Theory in Spain and Portugal; Antonio E. Pérez Luño.- 11. Is the "New Natural Law Theory" Actually a Natural Law Theory?; Francisco José Contreras.- 12. Alasdair MacIntyre on Natural Law; Rafael Ramis-Barceló.- 13. Dworkin and the Natural Law Tradition; María Lourdes Santos.- 14. Public Reason, Secularism, and Natural Law; Iván Garzón.

 

 

Livro "Biografía, filosofía y cristianismo en la obra de Alasdair MacIntyre", do Prof. Lucio Nontol

 Biografía, filosofía y cristianismo es una investigación exhaustiva sobre Alasdair MacIntyre, uno de los pensadores más relevantes y sugerentes de nuestro tiempo; porque analiza su visión del cristianismo, elemento central en su pensamiento desde sus primeros trabajos y hasta ahora nunca abordado de un modo completo y detallado en una investigación como esta. En nuestro contexto iberoamericano ha sido difícil trabajar el pensamiento de MacIntyre y durante décadas los que se han acercado al pensamiento de este autor han sido fácilmente etiquetados de ultraconservadores o neoconservadores. Dichas etiquetas han eclipsado la riqueza de un pensamiento serio, riguroso y siempre en evolución. ¿Por qué su lectura se ha reducido prácticamente a una obra –Tras la virtud- y casi a una serie de páginas –su principio sugerente y su final provocador? ¿Por qué es tan devastador volver a Santo Tomás, a las virtudes, a la comunidad y a la tradición? MacIntyre es un pensador no preocupado por unas ideas sino por un sistema y unas creencias. Más allá de positivismos, postmodernidades y filosofías analíticas para nuestro autor lo más relevante es elaborar un sistema, una cosmovisión coherente. Frente a tanta fragmentación y bricolaje de ideas y creencias, MacIntyre vuelve a poner en evidencia la necesidad en nuestros días de visiones globales y sistemáticas de la realidad pues sólo desde ellas se puede realizar una auténtica crítica a la situación actual. La obra que tienen en sus manos nos hace comprender en profundidad este sistema que nos ofrece MacIntyre contextualizada en el concepto de cristianismo.

 

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Livro de Owen Flanagan dialoga com a perspectiva crítica de Alasdair MacIntyre sobre moralidades

The Geography of Morals is a work of extraordinary ambition: an indictment of the parochialism of Western philosophy, a comprehensive dialogue between anthropology, empirical moral psychology, behavioral economics, and cross-cultural philosophy, and a deep exploration of the opportunities for self, social, and political improvement provided by world philosophy.

We live in multicultural, cosmopolitan worlds. These worlds are distinctive moral ecologies in which people enact and embody different lived philosophies and conceive of mind, morals, and the meaning of life differently from the typical WEIRD -- Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, Democratic -- person. This is not a predicament; it is an opportunity. Many think that cross cultural understanding is useful for developing a modus vivendi where people from different worlds are not at each other's throats and tolerate each other. Flanagan presses the much more exciting possibility that cross-cultural philosophy provides opportunities for exploring the varieties of moral possibility, learning from other traditions, and for self, social, and political improvement. There are ways of worldmaking in other living traditions -- Confucian, Daoist, Buddhist, Hindu, Jain, Muslim, Amerindian, and African -- that citizens in Western countries can benefit from. Cross-cultural learning is protection against what Alasdair MacIntyre refers to as being "imprisoned by one's upbringing."

Flanagan takes up perennial topics of whether there is anything to the idea of a common human nature, psychobiological sources of human morality, the nature of the self, the role of moral excellence in a good human life, and whether and how empirical inquiry into morality can contribute to normative ethics. The Geography of Morals exemplifies how one can respectfully conceive of multiculturalism and global interaction as providing not only opportunities for business and commerce, but also opportunities for socio-moral and political improvement on all sides. This is a book that aims to change how normative ethics and moral psychology are done.

 

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Owen Flanagan was born and raised in Westchester County, New York. He is the author of the classics Varieties of Moral Personality (1991) and Consciousness Reconsidered (1992). He lives in Durham, NC, where he is currently James B. Duke Professor of Philosophy and Co-director of the Center for
Comparative Philosophy at Duke University.

 

 

Publicada edição em inglês de biografia intelectual de Alasdair MacIntyre, por Émile Perreau-Saussine

 

This award-winning biography, now available for the first time in English, presents an illuminating introduction to Alasdair MacIntyre and locates his thinking in the intellectual milieu of twentieth-century philosophy.

Winner of the prestigious 2005 Philippe Habert Prize, the late Émile Perreau-Saussine’s Alasdair MacIntyre: Une biographie intellectuelle stands as a definitive introduction to the life and work of one of today’s leading moral philosophers. With Nathan J. Pinkoski’s translation, this long-awaited, critical examination of MacIntyre’s thought is now available to English readers for the first time, including a foreword by renowned philosopher Pierre Manent.

Amid the confusions and contradictions of our present philosophical landscape, few have provided the clarity of thought and shrewdness of diagnosis like Alasdair MacIntyre. In this study, Perreau-Saussine guides his readers through MacIntyre’s lifelong project by tracking his responses to liberalism’s limitations in light of the human search for what is good and true in politics, philosophy, and theology. The portrait that emerges is one of an intellectual giant who comes to oppose modern liberal individualism’s arguably singular focus on averting evil at the expense of a concerted pursuit of human goods founded upon moral and practical reasoning. Although throughout his career MacIntyre would engage with a number of theoretical and practical standpoints in service of his critique of liberalism, not the least of which was his early and later abandoned dalliance with Marxism, Perreau-Saussine convincingly shows how the Scottish philosopher came to hold that Aristotelian Thomism provides the best resources to counter what he perceives as the failure of the liberal project. Readers of MacIntyre’s works, as well as scholars and students of moral philosophy, the history of philosophy, and theology, will find this translation to be an essential addition to their collection.

 

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Trecho do livro. © Reimpressão autorizada. Todos os direitos reservados:

"In the twentieth century, liberalism was the target of two successive waves of critique: communism and fascism. In the 1930s, caught in the grip of these two threats, liberal democracies seemed in the short term to be doomed. In the Second World War, the alliance of liberals and communists triumphed over fascism. Then private property’s adversaries lost the Cold War. Today, liberalism is the only one left in the arena. The conflicts of the twentieth century have demonstrated that the regime that was in its beginning denounced as the weakest proved to be the strongest. But the questions raised by fascists and communists remain. "What place does liberalism give to greatness, to beauty? "ask some. "What place is there for justice?" ask others. These questions still resonate. Beneath the apparent consensus, liberalism is undermined. In 1945 and in 1989, might liberalism have won only by default? The bodies are satisfied, because comfort and security reign supreme. The soul is troubled.

Today, in reaction to the Nazi and Soviet infamies, human rights triumph. We answer totalitarianism with a politics of individual rights. We counter modern tyrannies with a theory of freedom as the absence of coercion. Naturally, these solutions have their merits. But throughout these pages I have tried to explain that in the eyes of Alasdair MacIntyre, they cannot be enough. We must protect ourselves from evil and guard against tyranny, but we must also support the desire for the good and the true, nourish it, and make it bear fruit. Pascal concisely summarizes my conclusions: "It is dangerous to make man see too clearly how he equals the beasts without showing him his greatness.” The passion for taking away our innocence has its limits: the desire to open our eyes to the atrocities of which human beings are capable must not lead to denying that man desires the good and that he is capable of the good. By absolutizing individual rights, we run the risk of ruining the very meaning of freedom that we propose to cultivate, of favoring a deleterious moral relativism, and of losing any sense of worthwhile purpose. Liberalism needs the habits, customs, and mores that individualism tends to destroy. The arrangement of the laws and the balance of powers is not enough: representative democracy also demands a sense of what a fulfilled life can look like. For MacIntyre, the political response that the cruelty of the twentieth century requires does not merely involve techniques of government, a sort of constitutional engineering, and a systematic circumventing of a human nature deemed too unreliable and too dangerous. It also involves, no doubt on a deeper level, nature itself and man himself.

After having for a long time explored human nature with a particular intensity, the West has bracketed off human nature, to the point of separating it from freedom. We must return to this separation. We must anchor freedom in human nature and relate existence to the two sources of the West, to the two desires by which the scholastic philosophers had understood humanity, and around which they had articulated practical reason: the desire to live in society and the desire to know the truth about God. If we believe the tradition with which MacIntyre aligns himself, freedom is not only the power to choose what pleases us. It is also the ability to act to achieve what is obviously good, in the pursuit of perfection. Yet the good is not always obvious. Knowledge of the good generally presupposes a moral authority. Liberalism delegates the search for the good to the individual alone; it affirms that it is up to the individual to find for himself his own idea of happiness. But it is possible that the good can only be discovered, lived, and deepened by a collective effort. It is not enough to say that political reasoning starts from the fact that men are capable of the worst and moral reasoning starts from the fact that men are capable of the best. For we cannot separate or even distinguish an essentially individual and private morality from an essentially amoral politics. Morality develops within a collective framework, which includes an important political dimension. As such, the individual could prove to be powerless to find the good. Often, moral authority is not so much the opposite of freedom as its necessary condition. According to MacIntyre, it is not true that the modern "individual", by freeing himself from moral authority, has won his independence and his title to reason. It is not true that it is only the being who is freed from the grip of tradition that is capable of rationality. That individual has in reality lost his reason. It was the moral authority embodied in a tradition that ensured a minimum of practical rationality."