MacIntyre’s Nietzsche or Nietzschean MacIntyre?
- Buket Korkut, Postdoctoral scholar, Department of Philosophy, University of Notre Dame, 100 Malloy Hall, Notre Dame, IN 46556, USA Email: bkorkut@nd.edu
Abstract
In After Virtue, Alasdair MacIntyre argues that the Enlightenment project of providing grounds for morality has been a failure, and believes that as a result, we are left with one of the two options: either a revival of Aristotelian virtue ethics or an endorsement of Nietzschean emotivism, i.e. a version of moral relativism. I shall first challenge MacIntyre’s emotivist portrait of Nietzsche and suggest an alternative reading of Nietzsche. If my diagnosis is correct, then we also need to reinterpret the relation between MacIntyre and Nietzsche. This article aims to identify the difference in their characterization of the problem of morality, evaluate their proposal for a possible dissolution of the problem, and compare their method of moral enquiry.
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